Sales turnover in APAC, especially in Japan, is extremely high because sales budgets are completely disconnected from reality.
Example: UroLift was launched in Japan, but the regulatory approval covers only 10–15% of the BPH (benign prostatic hyperplasia) patient population. Japan has an estimated 2–3 million men with BPH, but only a small fraction qualifies under the approved indication.
Despite this limited market, the sales budget required Teleflex to capture likely around 50% of the entire market to hit targets. This is mathematically impossible given the competition.
In Japan, UroLift directly competes not only with Boston Scientific’s device but also with Procept BioRobotics (Aquablation system). Both companies have strong clinical evidence, deeper resources, and significant brand presence, making Teleflex’s market share goals unrealistic from the beginning.
Sales teams in Japan raised these concerns, but the APAC and Japan senior management refused to reduce the targets.
As a result, the only “company-approved” strategy was to pressure distributors into bulk purchases every single month, regardless of real demand.
This approach left the sales force exhausted, hurt distributor trust, and distorted the true market situation.
In 2025, headquarters labeled the business “unprofitable” and decided to split it — a drastic move after ignoring repeated warnings from the field.
Within Japan, the culture is also toxic: people who perform strongly often become targets of jealousy rather than being supported.
Teleflex then acquired Biotronik to try to add revenue. But in cardiovascular, the company will face Medtronic, Abbott, Boston Scientific, Terumo, and others — all far larger players. The probability of success is extremely low.
